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This case study investigates how lower budget participation may be better suited to 
firms with a high budget emphasis, in lower uncertainty conditions.  The organisation 
studied generates greater benefits when budget participation is low, though it has a 
high budget emphasis.  This result is opposite to that found in Lau, et.al. (1995).  The 
reason for this difference is shown to arise because budget emphasis in the case firm 
is not primarily related to performance evaluation as defined in prior budget research 
(Hopwood, 1972). Instead, the main reason for budgeting is operational planning 
(Hansen and Van der Stede, 2003), and this difference is shown to lead to the 
opposing findings.  When budgets are used primarily for operational planning, their 
relationships to organisational antecedents appear to be different than when used for 
performance evaluation. 
 
Results from this study broaden the relevance of participative budgeting to firms that 
use budgets for reasons other than performance evaluation. It also emphasises that 
established budget relationships with commonly studied organisational and budgetary 
characteristics should be re-assessed, when budget reasons other than performance 




Management accounting research has focused significantly on the role of budgeting in 
organisations (Shields & Shields, 1998).  This has led to specific directional 
relationships being observed between the relevance of budgets to key organisational 
and budgetary characteristics (Chenhall, 2003; Shields & Shields, 1998; Hartmann, 
2000; Langfield-Smith, 1997). A dominant streams of budget research is participative 
budgeting (Shields & Shields, 1998; Shields and Young, 1993), and one of the most 
investigated antecedent organisational characteristic in management accounting 
research is environmental uncertainty (Chenhall, 2003; Luft and Shields, 2003).   
 
Most participative budgeting studies focus on the positive relation between 
participation and its effects, such as its impact on better budgets and decision making 
(Parker and Kyj, 2006; Magner, et.al. 1996; Shields and Shields, 1998; Nouri and 
Parker, 1998).   The few studies that have studied the relationship between causal 
antecedents such as uncertainty and budget participation have been survey based and 
find different relationships, depending on the level of uncertainty.   
 
Lau, et.al. (1995) built upon a stream of inter-connected studies by Brownell (1982), 
Hirst (1983), Brownell and Hirst (1986) and Brownell and Dunk (1992) in studying 
the relationship between participative budgeting and budget emphasis.  Considering 
uncertainty as a possible explanatory factor affecting this relationship, they find that 
when uncertainty is low, high budget emphasis must be accompanied by high budget 
participation for superior outcomes.  However, when uncertainty is high, regardless of 
budget emphasis, a higher budget participation style is needed. Lau, et.al. (1995) 
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argued that budget participation must be high in higher uncertainty environments, but 
only needs to be high in low uncertainty environments if budget emphasis is high.   
 
These findings infer that a low budget participation/high budget emphasis 
combination is not plausible when environmental uncertainty is low.  Using the case 
of a public utilities firm, this study investigates how this combination may still benefit 
an organisation, due to the focus of the organisation on budget reasons other than 
performance evaluation.   
 
The key factor limiting the analysis of prior studies has been their reliance on the 
performance evaluation reason to budget.  This is not surprising, as the pioneering 
studies of this stream of research (Brownell, 1982 and Hirst, 1983), sought to explain 
the difference in findings between two budgeting studies; Hopwood (1972) and Otley 
(1978). Both these studies viewed budgeting as a source of job related tension to 
employees, arising from its role as a performance evaluation device. Studies that have 
since attempted to explain the opposing findings of these two articles have led to the 
development of two large areas of budget research, participative budgeting (Shields 
and Shields, 1998) and the “Reliance on Accounting Performance Measures” 
(RAPM) (Hartmann, 2000).  Therefore, the focus of the majority of budget 
emphasis/participation studies since has been on its impact on budgets for 
performance evaluation reasons. 
 
An observation of prior research shows that budget emphasis measures used in prior 
management accounting studies have focused on budget evaluative style (Van der 
Stede, 2001; Ross, 1995; Brownell and Dunk, 1992; Brownell and Hirst, 1986), 
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originally developed by Hopwood (1972).  When prior research has investigated 
budget emphasis, the use of budgets for performance evaluation is used to proxy for 
budget emphasis (Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004; Hopwood, 1972).  This definition 
excludes emphasis on budgets for reasons other than performance evaluation.  
However, what occurs if organisations budget for reasons other than performance 
evaluation? 
 
Research is beginning to consider that the use of budgets for performance evaluation 
is only one of many reasons for budgeting in organisations.    Additionally, existing 
research acknowledges the difficulty in observing systematic relationships between 
organisational characteristics and budgetary variables, due to findings of different 
studies not being consistent (Chenhall, 2003), and therefore unclear.  This study puts 
forth the argument that one of the reasons for inconsistent findings may be attributed 
to existing budget research focusing on budgets only as performance evaluation 
devices (Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004) without considering its role for other 
reasons, such as operational planning (Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004; Hansen, et.al. 
2003)   
 
The budget reason predominantly investigated in budgetary research appears to be 
performance evaluation (Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004).  If non-evaluation reasons 
to budget such as operational planning are regarded more importantly than 
performance evaluation reasons, then how do they relate to other accepted budgetary 
characteristics in the management accounting literature, such as budget emphasis and 
budget participation?  How do commonly held relationships between these factors 
differ, and how may we improve our understanding of the contingent relationships 
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involving these factors in current research?  This leads to the main research question 
used for this paper: 
 
RQ: How does a consideration of different reasons to budget alter observed 
contingency relationships between environmental uncertainty, budget participation 
and budget emphasis? 
 
Budget research has advocated that in low uncertainty conditions, organisations with 
high budget emphasis require high budget participation (Lau, et.al. 1995).  Budget 
participation impacts the sharing of information between superiors and subordinates, 
and greater information sharing is generally assumed to positively affect job 
performance (Parker and Kyj, 2006), which leads to greater firm outcomes.  This is 
argued to be especially so in low uncertainty situations, as stability is greater, and the 
likelihood of budgets being accurate and relevant are higher (Lau, et.al., 1995).   
 
However, the possibility that lower budget participation could be beneficial to firms 
with a high budget emphasis is not investigated, in low uncertainty conditions. This is 
not surprising, as research has generally acknowledged that very few studies focus on 
the causal antecedents of budget participation (Poon, et.al. 2001; Shields and Shields, 
1998; Magner, et.al. 1996), and low uncertainty environments have never been linked 
to low budget participation (Lau, et.al. 1995).   
 
By considering a case where the predominant reason budget is not staff evaluation but 
primarily resource coordination and to a lesser extent, business unit evaluation, 
established relationships between participative budgeting and budget emphasis in 
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prior studies (Lau. et.al. 1995) are refined.  Specifically, in low uncertainty 
organisations, high budget participation may not be more beneficial even if firms have 
a high budget emphasis, especially if their primary reason to budget is resource 
coordination.  The difference between these findings and Lau, et.al.(1995) is that this 
case investigates a scenario where greatest importance is placed on a non- 
performance evaluation reason to budget. 
Literature Review and Theory Development 
Uncertainty and budget emphasis – inverse direct relationship 
 
Uncertainty has been one of the most explored causal antecedent variables in 
management accounting research.  This variable forms an important basis for 
theorising in management control related contingency research (Luft and Shields, 
2003; Chapman, 1997).  Many studies relating uncertainty to formal management 
control systems such as budgets have been conducted in prior research.  Generally, a 
negative relationship is observed between the level of uncertainty in an organisation, 
and the importance/use of formal financial reporting control systems, defined as 
budget emphasis. (Tymon. Jr, et.al.  1998). Govindarajan (1984) specifically found 
that managers apply more formal financial management controls in situations where 
the perceived environmental uncertainty of an organisation is low.  In high 
uncertainty firms, the use of more subjective appraisal controls was found to be more 
appropriate.  Govindarajan (1984) went on to argue that higher performance is aligned 
to an appropriate fit between firm uncertainty and use of controls.  There is a strong 
argument in prior research for an inverse relationship between formal financial 
management reporting controls and an organisation’s perceived uncertainty.  Kren 
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and Kerr (1993) similarly find the use of performance based compensation to be 
negatively related to the level of uncertainty in monitoring firms. 
 
Chenhall (2003) shows that the link between uncertainty and the relevance of 
budgetary control systems is marginally in favour of a negative relationship.  In the 
presence of high uncertainty, budget emphasis must be mixed with more interpersonal 
and flexible controls. These results, as argued in Chenhall (2003) are supported by 
Ezzamel (1990).  From another perspective, Merchant (1990) argued that there was a 
higher probability of information manipulation in the construction of budgets in 
higher uncertainty environments.  In times of high uncertainty, the impact of incentive 
based pay is also less, and therefore negatively related to uncertainty (Bloom, 1998).  
Given that incentive based pay is often based on a pre-determined financial standard, 
the weaker relationship of budgets to high uncertainty environments is again evident 
in Bloom (1998). 
 
For task uncertainty within firms, prior research suggests that uncertainty is 
negatively related to budget emphasis (Brownell and Dunk, 1991).  Brownell and 
Merchant (1990) showed that the lower the knowledge of relations between input and 
output units (task uncertainty proxy), the more difficult for budget numbers maintain 
relevance.  Lau, et.al. (1995) found that in low task difficulty/uncertainty 
environments, high budget emphasis enhanced performance.   
 
Overall, the results from prior literature appear to suggest that budgets are easier to 
generate in low uncertainty environments as future numbers are easier to predict and 
relied upon, whereas in high uncertainty environment, the relevance of budgets is 
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conditional upon greater budget participation, as budgets are intrinsically more 
difficult to generate.  A key factor influencing these results is that budget emphasis is 
defined as being budget “evaluative style” (Hopwood, 1972), and this approach has 
been used by a majority of budget emphasis studies.  What if an organisation has a 
high budget emphasis, but which is related to other budget reasons, such as resource 
coordination, as discussed in this study?  If budgets are not used for evaluation, the 
directional relationships between budget emphasis, budget participation and 
uncertainty need to be re-examined. 
Budget participation effect on link between uncertainty and 
budget emphasis 
 
From an evaluation perspective, prior research has argued that the inverse relationship 
between budget emphasis and uncertainty can be altered by managing the level of 
budget participation in organisations.  Budget participation is defined as the extent to 
which relevant staff is involved in, and has influence on the determination of his or 
her own budget (Poon, et.al. 2001; Shields and Shields, 1998).  If organisations wish 
to exert budget emphasis when uncertainty is high, budget systems require greater 
participation amongst staff (Lau, et.al. 1995, Govindarajan, 1986). This is because 
greater staff involvement and information sharing that characterises higher budget 
participation (Parker and Kyj, 2006) allows for information to be provided that 
reduces role ambiguity, which consequently makes a budget more relevant (Chenhall 
and Brownell, 1988).   
 
When uncertainty is low, prior research argues that organisations only need high 
budget participation if budget emphasis is high (Lau, et.al. 1995).  If budget emphasis 
is low, then budgets are not used or regarded as importantly, and therefore budget 
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participation is not necessary.  If budget emphasis is high, higher participation is 
necessary, as it assists employees to contribute to the budget setting process and also 
understand the numbers being set, as they will be evaluated on the budget numbers.   
 
However, and with the exception of Lau, et.al. (1995), evidence regarding how higher 
participation actually positively benefits in low uncertainty environments is not as 
evident in the literature.   What is known, is that the underpinning arguments for these 
rationales stem from the implicit assumption that budgets are used for evaluating staff 
(Brownell, 1982; Hirst, 1983), and if staffs are involved in the generation of these 
budgets, then they are more inclined to accept evaluations using budgets post period.  
But, what if an organisation does not use budgets to evaluate staff?  Does higher 
budget participation still assist firms with a high budget emphasis in low uncertainty 
environments? 
Budget participation itself is regarded as an exercise that first affects planning and 
control (Shields and Shields, 1998), prior to affecting evaluation.  It is because budget 
numbers are more accurate when participation is high, that these higher quality budget 
numbers arising from greater participation positively benefits budget emphasis and 
performance in higher uncertainty environments (Kren, 1992). 
 
However, when uncertainty is low, budget numbers are more easily determined, and 
the importance and use of budgets to plan may not be as necessary.  If budgets are 
used for evaluation under such conditions, budget participation only allows managers 
and staff to better understand the budget numbers used for their evaluation.    If 
budgets are not used for evaluation, or for reasons other than evaluation, then the need 
for budget participation in low uncertainty environments may be questioned.  Even if 
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budget emphasis is high for non-evaluation reasons, why would organisations direct 
staff to participate and invest their limited time to determine budget numbers, when 
they are not as actively evaluated on them, and budget numbers are easily predicted, 
as uncertainty is low? 
 
From this perspective, the relevance of high budget participation in high budget 
emphasis and low uncertainty conditions is questioned, and argued to be contrary to 
the findings of Lau et.al. (1995). This difference is a direct result of this study 
broadening the definition of budget emphasis to included emphasis on budget reasons 
other than performance evaluation. 
Research design & case description 
 
The case method attempts to provide a richness of interpretation in findings usually 
more difficult to obtain in other forms of research (Yin, 2002). This study uses a case 
methodology as most budget participation research to date has been conducted via 
survey research (Shields and Shields, 1998), and research that investigates individual 
firm situations in greater depth should help clarify or update existing relationships in 
organisational research (Yin, 2002).  
 
The explanation put forth in this case was not originally intended when considering 
the case as a research setting.  Initially, the financial controller of the asset 
management division of the case firm commented that his firm had stopped budgeting 
and had yielded greater benefits from doing so.  This led the authors to believe that 
this case involved the elimination of budget emphasis, and akin to a “beyond 
budgeting” scenario (Hansen, et.al. 2003).  However, upon studying the case, it 
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became apparent that the firm still maintained a high budget emphasis.  What really 
occurred was a significant reduction in budget participation amongst staff.  Given that 
the firm operated in a low uncertainty environment, this eventuality was thought to be 
unusual, as it was contrary to the findings of Lau, et.al. (1995). Lau, et.al (1995) had 
argued that in a low uncertainty environment, high budget participation and high 
budget emphasis was necessary. 
 
The case setting investigated was highly appropriate, as it observed a change in a 
budget system, from high to low participation, and was not merely an analysis of a 
low budget participation firm.  Therefore, incremental changes are highlighted and 
actual differences in effects considered.  If an existing low budget participation 
scenario had been examined, it could always be challenged by the question “what if 
they had high participation? Budget outcomes could have been better”.  By observing 
the change process from high to low and noting the differences, the robustness of the 
results are greater. 
 
Typically, case based research is conducted using face-to-face, telephone interviews 
and site visits to key staff in the setting investigated (Yin, 2002).  For this study, site 
visits and other interactions over a 2 year period had resulted in information being 
gathered from five key staff in the firm studied. 12 site visits were conducted to both 
the operating plants (3) and organisational headquarters (9) of the firm investigated.   
 
Of the five personnel – two provided information explicitly, i.e. via the conduct of 
formal face-to-face and telephone interviews. The other three provided information 
through unstructured discussions which were documented by the researcher upon 
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returning from the site visit.  The five individuals are also from both financial and 
operating arms of Firm A.  This is conducted to obtain a balanced perspective of the 
change in budget systems.  The five individuals are: 
Financial 
– Asset management controller: driver of budget change (Mr FC) 
– Accounts administrator: headquarters (Mr AA) 
Operational 
– Plant level senior officer: administration (Mr BM) 
– Operating plant manager (Mr PM) 
– Operations project manager: special projects (Mr SP) 
 
While direct quotes are sourced and paraphrased for Mr FC and Mr BM, the informal 
discussions and commentaries of Mr AA, Mr PM and Mr SP are not explicitly 
outlined, but instead, integrated into the description of the case, as their informal 
discussions better informed the researcher about the background of the firm, the 
description of the firm’s characteristics, and change in the budget system, that is 
explained below.   
 
The focus of the case is on the Asset Management Division, as the industry research 
liaison was a senior manager from this Division.  Also, this Division was primarily 
responsible for measuring and valuing the high value fixed assets of this public utility, 
and all related operations involving these fixed assets. Therefore, from an operational 
budgeting perspective, this Division was highly appropriate for investigating the 




The firm to be discussed in this study is anonymously titled Firm A for confidentiality 
reasons.  Firm A is a large public utilities firm based in Australia, supplying an 
essential public resource to a general populace of approximately 4.5 million.  The 
firm is very large, and operates as a state owned monopoly.  There exists no other 
competitor in the delivery of this firm’s core product.  The firm manages assets of 
AUD $11 billion, with approximately 3,500 staff employed and is responsible for 
annual capital works programs in excess of AUD $500 million.  Its assets are mainly 
comprised of 41 operating plants and an extensive infrastructure network linking the 
delivery and disposal of its core product from source points to consumers. 
 
Though the firm is state owned, its focus on efficiency and profitability is clear, and 
quite akin to a commercial organisation.  As mentioned by the Financial Controller of 
its Asset Management Division (Mr. FC), one of its three equal primary aims is “to be 
a successful business”. Furthermore, the firm is effectively structured as a private 
organisation, with its presiding state government being the sole shareholder.  
Annually, the firm is expected to generate “dividends” that are returned to 
shareholders (state government).   
 
Being a large, government owned corporation, it is not surprising to note that Firm A 
is highly structured.  Specifically, the management of 3,500 staff across operating 
plants and administrative headquarters requires the many divisions and business units.  
At a macro level, the organisation is headed by the board of directors, with the 
managing director responsible for the functioning of the firm.  Eight broad divisions 
are managed by the managing director, with each division containing multiple sub-
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divisions.  Specifically, the Asset Management Division is very strong structurally.  
41 operating plants are pooled under this Division, and each plant is classed as a sub-
division/unit.  The presence of organisational structure is strong in Firm A, and this 
also explains the high budget emphasis placed in Firm A.  This link is not surprising - 
the positive relationship between organisational structure and the use of formal MCS 
such as budgetary controls has been shown in prior budget research (Donaldson, 
2001; Kalagnanam and Lindsay, 1998), and noted in this study. 
Uncertainty 
 
The level of uncertainty impacting Firm A is identified by taking a stakeholder and 
technology approach. Uncertainty relating to transactions involving three external 
stakeholders are gauged, namely competitors, suppliers, customers, as used in 
Govindarajan (1984).  The fourth measure of uncertainty focuses on the internal 
nature of process technology used by the firm, as discussed in Perrow (1967) and 
Gordon and Narayanan (1984).   
 
The firm operates as a monopoly within its jurisdiction, and has no competitors to the 
supply of its core product.  It also operates within an environment where the volume 
of its demand is strongly predictable, as population growth is easy to ascertain and is 
correlated to demand for Firm A’s core product.  The resource offered by Firm A is 
used by all members within its jurisdiction.  Given the above, uncertainty relating to 
market competition and consumer demand is very low.   
 
The availability of supply for Firm A’s core product is determined by environmental 
factors, and outside the control of discretionary human actions.  However, in the 
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history of the firm, demand has never led to nil supply.  In times of low supply, the 
firm undertakes extensive marketing activities to limit the population’s use of its 
essential resource, thus driving down demand and ensuring supply always exceeds 
demand.  Firm A even has the power to implement restrictions on the use of its 
product, which if breached, attract severe financial penalties possible prosecution. For 
this reason, supplies of the firm’s core product has never fallen below 25% of Firm 
A’s capacity, when observing levels over the last five decades.  Given the high level 
of control over population use of its resource limiting supply side shortage, the 
availability of supply is almost certainly guaranteed, and therefore of low uncertainty.   
 
The definition of technology uncertainty is often misunderstood (Donaldson, 2001).  
Perrow (1967) was a pioneering theorist of technology uncertainty and referred to 
technology not only as a hardware or layout of fixed assets, but to the cognitive 
processing involved in completing a task (Donaldson, 2001).  In Firm A, the majority 
of operational tasks and processes undertaken are standardised, using a highly 
automated approach with standardised processes having remained unchanged for 
many years.  These are therefore regarded to be of low uncertainty.  There is also a 
lower probability for shocks in the process, due to the highly automated processes of 
the firm limiting the impact of human resource error in processes (Merchant and Van 
der Stede, 2003).  From an operational process perspective therefore, as described by 
Perrow (1967), the level of technology uncertainty in the organisation is low. 
 
Overall, all 4 uncertainty types considered in the study are low.  There is a low 
uncertainty of business environments (competitors, demand and supply) and tasks 




Budgeting in Firm A is primarily conducted to coordinate resources for a coming 
year, and to monitor a business units’ adherence to monthly cost targets.  Annually, 
the State Government provides a fixed amount to Firm A, and this aggregate amount 
is distributed to all departments, and operating plants.  As mentioned by Mr BM: 
 
“In here we budget to make sure that corporate provides plants with their desired 
amounts. Without a budget, you know, we won’t know how much each plant gets to 
spend next year.” 
 
Furthermore, and typically characteristic of a government owned public utility firm, 
the use of budgets for performance evaluation is not high, especially for staff.  Mr FC 
stated that bonuses based on budgets were only paid to the highest levels of staff, and 
even then, bonus percentages were quite low (approximately 6% of base salary).  The 
majority of staffs are not evaluated by budgets and even senior staffs are not impacted 
by budgets materially.   
 
The analysis of budget reasons reveals that budget emphasis in Firm A is very high, 
but for non-evaluation reasons.  Governmental approval of funds distribution requires 
budgets to be used as a controlling device, and therefore, budgets have always been 
regarded very importantly by Firm A and are actively used to report to senior 
management, who annually approve funding co-ordination distributions to 
administrative departments and operating plants.   
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Importantly, the change in budget system adopted by Firm A does not relate to budget 
emphasis.  As will be noted, the change in budget system is not a reflection of a 
change in reasons or emphasis on budgets, but a belief that budgets could be prepared 
to the same quality, with less staff input and effort expended (Mr AA).  This relates to 
a reduction in budget participation (Poon, et.al., 2001).   
 
This case does not attempt to produce a measure for identifying non-evaluation 
budget emphasis.  The aim of the study is to show that when a non-evaluation 
emphasis exists, the relationship between budget participation and budget emphasis is 
different in low uncertainty environments, when compared to prior studies focusing 
on evaluation as their criteria for budget emphasis. 
Budget participation 
 
To define budget participation in this case, responses relating to the six elements of 
participation as proposed by Milani (1975) and adopted in Parker and Kyj (2006) are 
used.  The Milani (1975) framework for budget participation is selected as it is one of 
the more widely used techniques for identifying budget participation (Parker and Kyj, 
2006; Kren, 1992; Brownell and Dunk, 1991). All respondent comments that related 
to the following six Milani (1975) elements of participation, were noted: 
 
1. Portion of budget set by subordinate 
2. Provision of reasoning by superior in budget revisions 
3. Frequency of subordinate driven budget discussion with superior 
4. Subordinate influence on final budget 
5. Importance of subordinate contribution to final budget 
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6. Frequency of budget discussions initiated by superior when budgets are set 
Pre-1999: High budget participation system  
 
Prior to the introduction of the new budgeting system in 2000, Firm A adopted a very 
detailed and highly labour intensive zero based budgeting process which required 
high levels of participation.  As identified by the plant level accountant Mr BM, each 
of the operating plants submitted a detailed budget, providing forecasted numbers for 
270 accounts which required detailed justifications.  These budget numbers were sent 
to a corporate committee which would then decide on the appropriateness of budget 
requests and confirm the budgets, or suggest revisions.  There were two components 
to the operating budget, as explained by Mr. BM – a routine operational budget based 
on “normal expected operations” and a non-routine request for funds, usually related 
to miscellaneous low-value infrastructure maintenance.  Overall, plant managers were 
expected to annually prepare an operating budget, based on routine and non-routine 
operating expenditures.  
 
This process appeared sound enough.  However, Mr BM stated that the level of 
justification for budget numbers required much staff effort and participation, which he 
argued to be detrimental and time consuming.  Key operational staff spent large 
amounts of time with plant level accountants to determine accounting numbers.  
Furthermore, the majority of these tasks were related to justifications that were 
immaterial.  As noted in the quote below, by Mr BM: 
 
“Basically, we had to justify every single budget number that went to corporate.  This 
applied to ridiculous levels of detail, for example I once saw this budget where we 
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had to research an umbrella’s price, can you believe it? Am umbrella’s cost! I had to 
work out the number of umbrellas requested by a plant to come up with a budget 
number that made up a “miscellaneous cost” item.  For a company with an annual 
budget in the billions, why are we expected to justify such a small amount? It’s time 
wasting and frustrating for all staff involved in the setting process.” 
 
The lack of materiality in justifying the majority of the budget numbers is accentuated 
by the fact that the majority of Firm A’s costs were in their twenty largest accounts. 
Approximately ninety percent of every plant’s budget related to these twenty 
accounts, with the remaining two hundred and fifty accounts sharing the final 10% of 
the budget.  This led to a large volume of justification, on accounting values that were 
primarily small and of little relevance to the overall budget of a plant.  Therefore, 
while budgeting was very detailed and accurate, the majority of budget related work 
was non-value adding as it was immaterial.  A frustrating aspect for Mr BM in the 
budget participation process was that manager justifications were often not considered 
on a plant by plant basis by corporate.  When requesting budget revisions, the 
corporate committee would often recommend mass and similar percentage drops for 
budgets across all plants, irrespective of operational manager needs and the unique 
individual situations facing managers of operating plants.  Plant managers would 
therefore submit revised requests based on these often inappropriate constraints. 
 
The frequency of discussion between accounting representatives of corporate and 
operational plant managers was usually quite high, as accounting representatives 
would continually liaise with managers to determine the appropriateness of budget 
values and had to provide a high volume of justifications, on a line by line basis.  
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Therefore, operational manager influence and contribution to the budget was usually 
welcomed and regarded as being very important.  Overall, an observation of 
participation in the old system may be summarised as follows: 
 
Milani (1975) elements Level of participation 
1. Portion of subordinate budget 
setting involvement 
Strong - operational staff needed to justify all 270 accounts  
2. Provision of reasoning by superior 
to subordinate in budget revisions 
Weak – Corporate committee simply recommends a fixed 
percentage reduction for department, little rationale given 
3. Frequency of subordinate driven 
budget discussions with superiors 
Strong – subordinates usually argue for more during budget 
revisions, repeatedly citing specific justifications as rationale for 
more budget funds. 
4. Subordinate perceived influence 
on final budget 
Moderate – Subordinates provide first iteration, then corporate 
committee identifies spending constraints and only allows a 
certain amount. 
5. Importance of subordinate 
contribution to budget 
Strong – Without subordinate assumptions and explanation of 
justifications, budgets not possible. 
6. Superior driven budget 
discussions in setting process 
Strong – Accounting representatives of corporate actively engage 
with plant managers in order to set budget numbers. 
Table 1: Pre-budget change participation summary 
 
The role of this budget process was seriously questioned by staffs from multiple 
levels of operations, leading to a review of the budgeting process in 1999.  This led to 
the introduction of a new budgeting system in 2000. 
Post – 1999: Low budget participation system 
 
In 1999, the value-add of the high level of staff participation in the budget setting 
process was questioned. As argued by Mr FC: 
 
 22
“We are an organisation that operates as a monopoly, in a market where our customer 
base is largely predictable.  Why do we need to think about our budgets?  What really, 
could happen to cause our budgeting system to be incorrect?  If you look at our 
budget numbers over the last decade or so, nothing’s changed, really – so why do we 
work so hard to make these predictions, these budget numbers every year?  You 
know, why do we go through this whole budget setting process in such a detailed and 
labour intensive way, when nothing really changes?” 
 
The new budgeting system attempted to accomplish three primary objectives, 
according to Mr FC.  First, it attempted to aggregate accounts and reduce the number 
of accounts reported from 270 in the old system to 120 accounts.  Second, the new 
budgeting system attempted to reduce the amount of justifications required to be made 
by operational staff, for all budget items, only the top twenty accounts.  Therefore, the 
zero based budgeting system was limited to the top 20 accounts, with the remaining 
accounts being developed incrementally, from prior period numbers.  The remaining 
accounts representing 10% of the budget’s value were therefore only loosely 
controlled, and did not require detailed justifications as was the case in the old system.     
 
Thirdly, with the exception of the largest 20 accounts that still need to be justified, the 
remaining numbers in the budget itself are not actually forecasted, but “benchmarked” 
from a previous year’s value, and surprisingly adjusted downwards by a set 
percentage (usually 2-3%) in order to provide plant managers an incentive to pursue 
lower costs for the coming period.  Therefore, the effort that traditionally 
accompanied the creation of a future budget number was replaced by a commitment 
to make costs lower than in previous years by using prior year benchmarks as 
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budgets.   This approach, which departs from traditional budgeting, is only made 
possible by the fact that the firm operates in a low uncertainty environment.  Mr FC 
argued that his firm was perfectly placed to take a benchmarking approach as their 
numbers did not change from period to period, making prior numbers more relevant to 
future periods. 
 
In the event that prior year numbers are expected by a plant manager to change, they 
may request for a change to a benchmark – however, Mr. FC argued that this occurred 
very sporadically, and when it did occur, the process was more easily facilitated as 
these deviations were small in number and easily addressed promptly by corporate. 
 
The new budgeting system places more focus on plant managers to lower and not just 
maintain costs, and reduces the detrimental effects of the gaming process which leads 
to dysfunctional behaviour, in budget setting (Jensen, 2003; Wallander, 1999).  This is 
done by establishing fixed benchmarks based on prior period figures.  What is 
particularly interesting is that this change has actually achieved more organisational 
goals, but significantly lessened the forecasting participation of staff involved in 
budget preparation.  Though a budget document is still produced for corporate to 
approve, all numbers but the largest 20 accounts in the document are benchmarks 
from previous periods, as opposed to being forecasted numbers in the traditional sense 
of a budget. 
 
Overall, therefore, budget participation in the new system is significantly reduced.  
The key reason for this lies in the lower justification expected by corporate, from 
operational budgets provided by plants.  The need for operational managers to be 
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actively involved in the budget process is now less.  Though staff influence on the 
final budget and the importance of their input is less, this does not appear to concern 
staff, as the low uncertainty impacting the organisations does not require staff 
involvement in the budget setting process.  Prior period values are seen as an 
appropriate proxy for future period values.  A summary of the participation elements 
as used by Milani (1975) is given below, for the new budget system: 
Milani (1975) elements Level of staff participation 
1. Portion of subordinate budget 
setting involvement 
Moderate – Less than before, as most staff justification 
only occur if deviations expected from prior period, and 
if so, only on the largest 20 accounts  
2. Provision of reasoning by superior 
to subordinate in budget revisions 
Weak – Same as for old system - corporate committee 
simply recommends a fixed percentage budget reduction 
for department, little rationale given 
3. Frequency of subordinate driven 
budget discussions with superiors 
Moderate – Less budget revisions than before, as 
requirement for justifications is less. 
4. Subordinate perceived influence on 
final budget 
Weak  – Less subordinate input than before, as most 
budget numbers kept to prior period benchmarks  
5. Importance of subordinate 
contribution to budget 
Moderate  – Less importance than before, subordinate 
assumptions and explanation of justifications only 
required on exceptions and for largest 20 accounts,  
6. Superior driven budget discussions 
in setting process 
Moderate – Less engagement than before due to 
benchmarking approach. 
Table 2: Post-budget change participation summary 
Outcomes from budget system change  
 
Firm A still places a high budget emphasis but now requires less budget participation 
from its staff, owing to its consolidation of immaterial account sizes and focusing on 
benchmarking as opposed to forecasting.  As a result of this new approach, 
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administrative time and cost savings are generated due to lower budget participation, 
as mentioned by Mr. BM: 
 
“It’s funny that we are actually now achieving more goals by doing less than before.  
Now, we don’t really make staff involve themselves in the budget, we just use last 
year’s numbers for most of our accounts, and we have had no problems with this new 
system”. 
 
Financially, Mr FC stated that Firm A calculation estimates shows that 55% of the 
AUD $60 million drop in operating costs of the firm from 1999 to 2000 can be 
attributed to the savings from the new budget system.  This saving can be attributed to 
two areas, administration and operations. Administratively, the equivalent cost of 
preparing a budget in estimated time savings has been estimated to be approximately 
$6.6 million, with the remaining AUD $26.4 million relating to cost reductions caused 
by the new benchmarking system.  
Results analysis and commentary 
 
Contrary to Lau, et.al. (1995), the relevance of high budget participation in low 
uncertainty firms is questioned, even when firm budget emphasis is high.  The key 
differentiating factor for a deviation from Lau, et.al. (1995) is the consideration of 
reasons to budget other than performance evaluation.  In this study, the use of budgets 
to coordinate resources, an operational planning category of reasons to budget, was 
adopted by the case firm investigated.   
 
 26
Though the old budget system in Firm A was accurate, it was also time consuming, 
and in an environment where most operational factors were predictable, there was a 
lower perceived need by management to undertake the full forecasting process in its 
entirety.  The need for budget participation was not as great, as most operational staff 
were not evaluated using a budget, and in a low uncertainty environment, budget 
numbers are easily predicted.  Building upon this rationale, management approved the 
introduction of a new system that maintained the budget emphasis of the organisation, 
while reducing the need for budget participation, through the use of benchmarking.   
The majority of the accounting numbers reported in budget reports was not actually 
forecasted, but benchmarked from prior year figures. 
 
The reasons to budget of Firm A strongly influenced the theoretical arguments for 
lower budget participation in this low uncertainty, high budget emphasis firm.  Given 
that Hansen and Van der Stede (2004) argue that prior budget research bases its 
findings on studies that predominantly view budgets from a performance evaluation 
perspective, the detailed investigation of budgeting in firms that use it for other 
reasons reveals alternative relationships between budget variables and organisational 
characteristics, such as a plausible link between low uncertainty, low budget 
participation and high budget emphasis.   
 
Firms that operate in low uncertainty environments, especially, may not need to 
“forecast”.  As highlighted by Mr FC, there is no value-add in investing additional 
resources into predicting budget numbers in low uncertainty conditions, as budget 
numbers are highly predictable.  This means that budget numbers don’t inform senior 
management of anything new, or which they do not already expect.  This argument 
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was similarly put forth by Wallander (1999), when critiquing the usefulness of 
budgets in firms.   
 
Prior research suggests budget participation to be high in low uncertainty 
environments (Lau, et.al, 1995), because staff evaluation is important in the budget 
setting process. Setting budget numbers allows for more equitable performance 
evaluation in the budgeting process, even in low uncertainty conditions.  However, 
when an organisation does not use a budget to evaluate, but more for resource 
coordination, budget participation is not as necessary, even in firms with a high 
budget emphasis.    
Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
 
When the primary reason for budgeting changes focuses on operational planning, 
accepted relationships between variables in budgetary research may change.  With the 
exception of Hansen and Van der Stede (2004), the nature of this difference has not 
been explicitly investigated in prior research.  While the above two study used a 
survey based approach, this study uses a more case based method and highlights how 
this difference actually enacts.  Results from existing research which has studied the 
relationship between uncertainty, budget participation and budget emphasis are shown 
to be different, when budget reasons other than performance evaluation are dominant 
(Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004). 
 
Future research that focuses on the role of operations budgeting in organisations with 
consideration for the specific reasons to budget are recommended.  Also, more case 
based research that investigates the impact of non-evaluation budget reasons will 
further inform the budgeting literatures of how various reasons differently relate to 
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commonly studied organisational and budgetary characteristics.  Finally, more studies 
that investigate the impact of rolling budgets on the role of the traditional annual 
budget are required across the different budget reasons, as this will further expand our 
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